Israel’s original military doctrine, formulated by David Ben-Gurion, emphasized three elements: deterrence, early warning, and decisive victory.
Yet, Israel has experienced deterrence and intelligence failures at least twice, in October 1973 and October 2023. In both cases, the IDF did not deter its opponents, and Israel’s intelligence apparatus failed to warn about its consequence – an impending attack. The recurrence of these failures questions their centrality in Israel’s strategic doctrine.
Deterrence assumes that enemies will refrain from attacking out of fear of severe retaliation, but it is largely an elusive and problematic psychological concept. Military superiority and threats of retaliation are not always successful in preventing an adversary from attacking. Even if the threats are credible, the opponent may decide to pay the cost to achieve the expected utility.
For Hamas, the perceived benefits of challenging Israel outweighed the costs of potential punishment because their religious commitments dominated the rational deterrence logic. Israel underestimated Hamas’s resolve to destroy Israel and its conviction that this could be attained. Similarly, Israel did not realize that its containment policy, carried out for two decades, has eroded its deterrence.
Even if deterrence works during a certain period, it may only be temporary due to a variety of factors that affect the strategic calculus of an opponent. Over time, enemies may test the limits of deterrence due to a change in circumstances, reassessing the risk involved in offensive actions. Surprise attacks are generally seen as awarding military advantages to the initiating side, and success in achieving a surprise undermines the effectiveness of deterrence.
Following the 1973 intelligence debacle, the IDF significantly expanded its intelligence corps and also honed its capabilities by adopting advanced technologies. For example, it could tell exactly which lorry in a convoy traveling from Iraq toward Lebanon carried arms for Hezbollah.
It provided the most exact data for executing numerous successful targeted killings of terrorists with minimal collateral damage. Yet, on October 7, 2023, it failed to provide a warning despite the many signals detected, and Israel was surprised once more.
Intelligence failures occur due to several key factors. In the Israeli case, analysts fell prey to confirmation bias, overlooking evidence that did not support existing theories. Indeed, the Hamas attack, “the Jericho Wall plan,” was in the hands of the Israeli intelligence but not properly communicated to decision-makers in the right context. It misread signals and intentions.
There is growing evidence that the IDF over-relied on technological means of collecting intelligence at the expense of human intelligence. Similarly, the use of the Devil’s Advocate function became a ritual rather than a crucial method for checking reality by imagining unlikely scenarios. Overconfidence and the illusion of control also beleaguered Israeli intelligence in 2023.
It all boils down to the fact that human beings are fallible. We cannot expect to receive early warning about the corrosion of deterrence and about an imminent attack. Therefore, these error-prone elements – neither the neglect of intelligence nor the necessary steps to enhance deterrence – cannot serve as the cornerstones of Israel’s national security doctrine.
A revision of military policies is needed
Yet, instead of relying on early warning and deterrence, Israel has no choice but to build a better defensive posture, particularly since it may face a multifront scenario again. It needs a larger standing army that can better protect Israel’s land borders, as well as larger reserve units in the settlements along the border. Israel has to deploy a larger and stronger military able to parry the enemy attacks and to move on the offensive at least on two fronts simultaneously.
A larger army is also called for to attain a decisive victory as quickly as possible, which in turn delays the next round of violence.
Shortening the compulsory military period, which reduces the size of the standing army, is no longer an option, and increasing the pool of available conscripts is necessary. All efforts should be made to tap the manpower found in the ultra-Orthodox community.
In addition, the reserve corps should be expanded by ending the lenient discharge policy. In contrast to the past, the reserve units need better training and equipment, with upgraded maintenance. The widespread belief within the IDF brass before the war that reserve units no longer have a central role in waging modern war proved patently wrong.
A larger army costs more money. Moreover, those serving in the regular army and in the reserves need to be better compensated for their time and patriotism. Therefore, a larger defense budget is imperative, even at the expense of social services.
Israel must also abandon the policy of containment/restraint, which was intended primarily to extend the periods of quiet along the border and to save blood and treasure. It proved counterproductive.
Exercising containment over time conveys weakness, while the aversion to military confrontation in a region with a political culture that values the use of force is part and parcel of the rules of the game. After all, fear is the best political currency in the Middle East.
Moreover, an erosion of deterrence brings the next round of violence closer. Containment in Gaza also caused complacency that led to a calamitous strategic surprise.
Israel was satisfied with the formula of “quiet for quiet” in Gaza. Although this spared the Israeli population from missile attacks, it gave Hamas time to buttress its regime and build up its forces without interference, creating a greater future risk to Israel, as the Hamas attack of October 7 indicated.
Similarly, Jerusalem has allowed Hezbollah to acquire a huge missile arsenal over the years, acting as a deterrent for Israel. Hezbollah’s missiles did not “rust,” as former IDF chief of staff Moshe Ya’alon predicted at the turn of the millennium, and they caused enormous damage in the 2006 Second Lebanon War.
Moreover, the policy of restraint normalizes the use of force by Israel’s adversaries. The world got used to missiles raining down on Israel’s population, and Israel’s success in intercepting them undermined the legitimacy to respond.
Restraint allows the “acceptable” doses of violence against Israel to increase incrementally. Hamas gradually extended the range of its missiles, putting an increasing number of Israelis on alert and making their lives miserable. The payload of their warheads also increased.
Israel does not have the luxury of dispensing with the use of preemptive strikes, which were a core element of its original military doctrine. There is considerable strategic sense to such operations, despite the inherent risks involved.
Today, Israel is paying a staggering price for its delay in mounting a strong military response to previous provocations, which would have instilled fear in its enemies.
In the wake of the events of October 7, it appears that Israel over-relied on containment; a better balance between this policy and the preventive use of force must be reestablished. Kicking the can down the road is rarely a prudent course of action.
The writer is a senior researcher at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security and head of the Strategy, Diplomacy, and Security Program at the Shalem Academic Center.
