Defense Minister Israel Katz was on a roll.
Until he ran head-first into new IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir on Monday night when he tried to intervene in an ongoing investigation and start a take-down of the IDF legal division, but was slapped back with a public statement by Zamir.
There are still questions about what the long-term consequences will be for both Katz and Zamir from this conflict, but in the short-term it looked like an unforced error in which he had to rapidly retreat from a fight with likely the most popular figure in Israel at this moment.
But let’s backpedal to what had Katz on a roll.
Katz successfully pressured now former IDF chief Herzi Halevi to quit only two months after becoming defense minister.
As part of that process, he also got Halevi to publish the IDF probes into October 7, which helped Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu try to shift more blame from himself for failing to prevent the disaster, onto the military and the Shin Bet.
Since he was defense minister, even if he did not have a direct role, the Syrian Assad regime fell and he succeeded in getting government funding for building a new tougher fence on the Jordanian border.
Other than a more minor error where he got into an unnecessary fight with IDF Intelligence Chief Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder, Katz had not lost any battles.
But he had a much weaker opponent.
Halevi's career after October 7
Fair or not, Halevi’s reputation was permanently stained by his failure as IDF chief to prevent Hamas’s October 7 invasion.
Halevi himself had vowed to resign before his three year term expired, some demanded he resign after Hamas was mostly beaten in Rafah in summer 2024, and by this January he had reached two years. In other words, Halevi was on borrowed time.
Likewise, Halevi had delayed the October 7 probes for a long time. Sometimes for understandable reasons of the war reigniting and distracting the attention of his commanders, but sometimes for more questionable reasons, with many observers believing that the IDF reports on October should have come out by summer 2024.
Zamir is a different situation entirely.
Unlike Halevi who was picked by the previous government, Netanyahu himself hand-picked Zamir and he and Katz have fallen over themselves to repeatedly praise him as more aggressive than his predecessor. In fact, Netanyahu would have picked Zamir over Halevi had he been in office at the time.
Also, if Halevi had a brave past as a deadly special forces fighter, as IDF chief he struck a more philosophical and cerebral tone versus Zamir who fits the image of the classic macho gruff Israeli soldier worshipped by much of the population on both sides of the spectrum.
And whereas Netanyahu is trying to shift October 7 blame onto Halevi and the Shin Bet, but he knows that he is still politically vulnerable to blame for the disaster, all parties made it clear leading into his appointment that Zamir was blameless.
In fact, Zamir may currently be the most popular major public figure in Israel at this moment.
Apparently, Katz must have thought that Zamir, out of loyalty to Katz and Netanyahu for being given the IDF chief job, would desert IDF Military Advocate General Maj. Gen. Yifat Tomer Yerushalmi when the defense minister signaled that she was the next target in the government’s plan to tear down the legal establishment’s leading officials.
Maybe Katz assumed this because he succeeded, directly or indirectly, in getting Zamir to quickly show the door to outgoing IDF chief spokesperson Brig. Gen. Daniel Hagari, though the new IDF chief might have simply transferred Hagari to another role if there had been no pressure.
In addition, Zamir appointed Maj. Gen. Tamir Yadai as his deputy chief, Maj. Gen. Yaniv Asur as new southern command chief, both favorites of the political Right, even though Halevi had passed over them for promotion, and they were both moving toward retirement.
But these were easy moves which Zamir might have made on his own, with the exception that he would have replaced Hagari with a close associate, but likely allowed him a different post.
Katz and the IDF
In contrast, Katz was now going after the IDF MAG.
At least until now, the IDF MAG is highly respected within the military and has bent over backward to facilitate the most aggressive Israeli war in 50 years, if not ever.
When top IDF commanders have wanted her war probes of IDF soldiers to be delayed or to go under the radar, she has tried to comply, while still seeking to remain within the spectrum of international standards.
Also, no military commanders, right-wing or left-wing, like leakers.
If Brig. Gen. (res.) Oren Solomon, the high-level officer and suspect under investigation, did in fact leak or try to leak classified information that was part of the October 7 probe into the Gaza Division or some other matter, as is alleged, Zamir would have absolutely no patience for him regardless of who he wanted to leak the information to.
Most importantly, the IDF MAG is a much harder target for Netanyahu and Katz because Zamir has authority over her.
Unlike Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara and Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar who the government can fire at its discretion if there is no special legal bar (such as waiting until the Qatargate probe is finished), no one but Zamir can fire the IDF MAG.
This means they cannot get rid of her without having a direct battle with Zamir, something they do not want.
Finally, even as Netanyahu has accused the attorney-general of failing to block the International Criminal Court from going after him, he knows very well that there is still a far worse scenario in which the ICC could go after a wide array of IDF personnel.
If he tries to fire the IDF MAG, he would far more directly undermine Israeli efforts to protect the iDF before the ICC.
In time, Zamir or the IDF MAG may falter and become more vulnerable, but for now, Katz might think twice before going after her again, especially before trying to intervene in an ongoing investigation.
