A former head of Israeli Military Intelligence, Maj.-Gen. Tamir Hayman, recently said that, while in the past, the borders of the Middle East were drawn in Europe, now, the European borders are being demarcated in the Middle East. He was alluding to the fact that the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations have become intertwined with attempts to prevent the looming escalation surrounding the Iranian nuclear issue.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s offer to US President Donald Trump to mediate in nuclear negotiations with Iran, alongside his proposal to establish an external government in Kyiv, has made it clear that Russia is pursuing two parallel foreign policy tracks. It seeks to accelerate the normalization of its ties with the US and to weasel out of Trump’s ceasefire initiative.
Yet, two significant questions remain: Should the White House rely on Russian promises to deliver on Iran, and is Moscow capable of doing so?
On the Ukraine front, Moscow is eager to continue its invasion unimpeded, helped by Trump’s apparent willingness to support Putin, even as the United States continues to negotiate for a ceasefire. Putin is also keen to disentangle Russia-US normalization from the Ukrainian track. Rather than agree to an unconditional ceasefire, Putin is opting for delay tactics and offering Trump help on other pressing crises.
Putin’s proposal to mediate preceded Trump’s recent ultimatum, which gave Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei two months to reach a new nuclear deal or face consequences, hinting at a possible US-Israeli military attack on Iran.
Moscow has the motivation to promise Trump a foreign policy win. Putin views normalized relations with the US on multiple fronts as a means of increasing Russia’s global influence and restoring its image as a major power on the world stage.
Although Russia has developed close relations with Iran over the past three years – due to Tehran’s military assistance – the Kremlin prioritizes deepening its relationship with the US, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The latter two hold the keys to Russian economic stability through oil price coordination in OPEC+.
Instead of explicitly choosing sides, Russia would prefer to recalibrate its commitments to Iran and portray itself as a bulwark supporter of the Islamic Republic. It might not be a coincidence that the signing of a strategic partnership treaty between Moscow and Tehran was scheduled for January 17, just three days before Trump’s inauguration.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov rushed to Tehran on February 25, a week after meeting his US counterpart, Marco Rubio, in Riyadh. On March 14, Russia, China, and Iran met to coordinate their positions on the Iranian nuclear program.
RUSSIA’S CHANGING approach to the Islamic Republic is already showing. Tehran expects Moscow and Beijing to serve as its strategic hinterland, supplying it with arms, deterring its adversaries, deflecting economic pressures, and providing political support to it and its proxies.
But Russia is withholding air-defense systems and modern aircraft crucial for coping with a possible attack on Iranian soil, especially given the damage to Iran’s air defenses that have left it vulnerable following Israeli airstrikes in October. Russian support for the Houthis has also slowed down.
But would Russia help bring Iran to a “yes”?
Russia does not have sufficient influence to coerce Khamenei into succumbing to Trump’s ultimatum and rolling back its nuclear program, and Iran will ultimately decide on its own. Tehran’s choice of Oman as the mediator with Washington reflects that it doesn’t trust Moscow with a go-between role.
Nevertheless, the Iranians are closely following the realignment between Putin and Trump. If Russian and Chinese support cannot be taken for granted by Tehran in the scenario of a military attack, its strategic options will be narrowed, and it will be further isolated and cornered.
For the US, having Putin on board could mean that Moscow will refrain from rushing to Iran’s aid, which increases Washington’s leverage in an Iran deal and serves as a potential game-changer, especially given the short timeline Trump has set.
Khamenei once again faces the dilemma of whether to curtail the nuclear program or face an existential threat to his regime. Iran may agree to “drinking a chalice of poison” by rolling back its nuclear enrichment, dismantling its nuclear facilities, and allowing strict verification measures as it has done in the past.
It may well be easier for the regime to receive that chalice from a Russian or Chinese hand rather than an American one. Putin (and Xi) might give Tehran a more palpable face-saving exit by offering it further civilian nuclear reactors, economic cooperation promises, and even conventional arms.
Ultimately, Russia’s involvement could prove highly useful for a nuclear deal with Iran. However, there is a cost: The extent of Russian support will depend on the Trump administration’s willingness to continue accommodating Moscow’s sabotage of the ceasefire talks with Ukraine.
The writer, a retired lieutenant colonel in the IDF, served for over 20 years in Israel’s military intelligence, specializing in Russian strategy in the Middle East. He is a senior fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.
