For many years, there hasn’t been such a broad Israeli consensus across the political spectrum regarding the necessity of striking Iran’s nuclear facilities. Politicians from both the Right and Left, who usually find themselves in fierce battles on almost every issue, are now competing in a display of impressive militancy – it’s a shame this spirit wasn’t present before the events of October 7.
The key questions are: Is the Begin Doctrine still relevant today? And can Israel achieve the goal of preventing a nuclear Iran through other means, especially considering that an Israeli strike would cause significant but only short-lived damage and that Iran could quickly recover?
The first implementation of the Begin Doctrine was Operation Opera in June 1981, when Israel destroyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor, followed by Operation Outside the Box in 2007, when Israel destroyed a North Korean-built reactor in Syria.
The Begin Doctrine has been echoed for years by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, along with his long-standing anti-Iran campaign, peaking now as nuclear negotiations between the US and Iran resume – despite Trump’s previous combative declarations and Israel’s hope that he would align with its aggressive stance.
Proponents of a strike, both Right and Left, often cite the infamous “countdown clock” located in Palestine Square in Tehran, which counts down to Israel’s planned destruction by 2040, reflecting the Ayatollahs’ public and unapologetic commitment to Israel’s annihilation.
Another major lesson from October 7 is that Israel must assess capabilities, not intentions. Given that a regional state with nuclear capabilities openly declares its desire to destroy Israel, the country must act to eliminate such capabilities before they become militarized.
The two case studies that strike supporters rely on – Iraq and Syria – are vastly different from Iran in every possible aspect: the status and geographic concentration of their nuclear programs, the ability to destroy them quickly and relatively safely, their military and political alliances, their military strength, and the likelihood of a counterattack.
Iran’s nuclear project has been developing over decades, dating back to the Shah’s era, and has reached a relatively secure position despite many internal and external delays.
Unlike Iraq and Syria, whose nuclear programs centered around a single above-ground facility, Iran has numerous nuclear sites, beyond just the well-known Fordow and Natanz facilities, spread across its vast territory, heavily fortified and underground.
Moreover, unlike Iraq and Syria, Iran is a scientific powerhouse, having trained a top-tier nuclear cadre, meaning its nuclear knowledge will remain intact regardless of physical damage.
Iranian Allies
IRAN ALSO enjoys significant alliances with major powers like Russia and China and has successfully, at least temporarily, softened its Sunni-Shi’ite conflicts, forging ties with leading Arab and Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey.
In terms of military capability – especially missile strength – Iran’s power far exceeds that of Iraq in its time, and certainly that of the weakened Syrian regime under Bashar al-Assad in 2007.
Despite its internal challenges, Iran is a demographic, geographic, and military powerhouse.
Contrary to popular belief, Iran’s nuclear program has not yet become militarily ready, mainly because the Iranians have not yet decided to cross the nuclear threshold due to religious and political considerations.
Given all of this, there is no justification for launching an ineffective strike right now – one that would fail to set back Iran’s program by at least a decade despite the tempting prospect of crippling Iran’s air defenses.
An independent Israeli strike, without American firepower and logistical backing, could lead to catastrophic global consequences for which Israel would be blamed, unify Iranians around their regime, strengthen the Sunni-Shi’ite axis that deeply opposes Zionist attacks on Muslim countries, and prompt Iran’s allies to help in quickly rebuilding its nuclear capabilities.
Given these circumstances, Israel would be wiser to “go with the flow” with the United States and leave handling the Iranian nuclear issue to Washington – whether through devastating economic sanctions that could collapse Iran’s economy or by negotiating a better deal than the JCPOA [the 2015 nuclear deal].
Israel should try to be as involved as possible in shaping the terms of such an agreement – for example, ensuring a long-term, fixed presence of IAEA inspectors in Iran and enabling surprise inspections of nuclear sites.
In any case, if military action becomes necessary, it should be US-led and not carried out by Israel acting as a subcontractor.
Israel’s concerns about an Iranian nuclear bomb are understandable and require special attention, just like it must monitor Egypt’s military buildup in Sinai and its civilian nuclear program, which could easily turn military, Turkey’s neo-imperialist ambitions in Syria, the stability of the Jordanian regime, and so on.
However, independent military action is not always the correct option, especially not under these circumstances, when Israel lacks the ability to fully eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities and can only delay them temporarily.
At this stage, it seems that relying on and coordinating with the US is the better path for Israeli interests.
The writer is a Middle East expert and a former lecturer at Bar-Ilan University and Netanya Academic College.
