Israel’s decision last week to block a planned visit to Ramallah by the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, and three other Muslim countries triggered predictable handwringing around the world, especially in those countries themselves.
Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud, whose trip would have been the highest-ranking visit by a Saudi official since 1967, said the decision showed Israel’s “extremism and rejection of peace.”
Jordan’s Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi chimed in as well, calling the move an example of how Israel “kills any chance for a fair and comprehensive Israeli-Arab settlement.”
A joint statement by some of the ministers who were scheduled to take part accused Israel of “arrogance,” of “disregard for international law,” and of pursuing “illegitimate measures and policies that besiege the brotherly Palestinian people and their legitimate leadership.”
These condemnations were loud, coordinated, and expected. But they were also, for the most part, performative — aimed more at international optics and domestic audiences than at actually changing Israel’s position.
Why would Israel agree to green-light a high-profile delegation intended to lend momentum to efforts to push forward a two-state solution precisely at a time when Jerusalem, in the wake of October 7, is adamantly opposed to the idea? Not only is the government opposed, but as polls show, the majority of the public is as well.
An Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) poll in March found that support for a two-state solution declined to 24% among the general public, down from 38% in September 2024. Ten years ago, by comparison, a similar INSS poll found that 60% of the public supported the idea. In the March poll, only 15% of Jewish Israelis favored a two-state solution, a decline from 31% in September.
A Jewish People Policy Institute survey from March had similar results, with only 11% of Jewish Israelis in that poll expressing support for negotiations toward a Palestinian state.
The foreign ministers’ visit was to come just two weeks ahead of an international conference organized by Saudi Arabia and France in New York to push for a two-state solution, with France considering unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state and urging other Western countries to do the same.
In that context, the Ramallah visit was not an isolated diplomatic gesture. It was a launchpad. Allowing it to proceed would have been, in Israel’s view, akin to scoring an own goal.
Some argue that barring the Saudi foreign minister could further stall long-term normalization with the kingdom or sink hopes of bringing Riyadh into the Abraham Accords framework. But the Saudis themselves have made it abundantly clear: normalization is contingent on tangible Israeli steps toward Palestinian statehood. That’s a line this Israeli government — and much of the public — is unwilling to cross, particularly after October 7.
From the Israeli perspective, the Palestinians had a mini-state of their own in Gaza before October 7. That experiment failed — catastrophically. Hamas quickly took over, stockpiled weapons, built an underground terror infrastructure, trained a terrorist army, and launched the deadliest attack on Israel since its founding. To now replicate that failed model in Judea and Samaria would, in the minds of most Israelis at this time, be an act of sheer madness.
Moreover, a look at the countries represented by foreign ministers in the delegation, at least according to some reports, reveals that Turkey and Qatar were on the list. Turkish President Tayyip Recep Erdogan is vehemently anti-Israel, implacable in his poisonous rhetoric, and hosts Hamas leaders in Ankara.
Qatar, for its part, continues to host Hamas’ leadership and is a major force, if not the primary force, behind the demonization and delegitimization of Israel around the world.
Why, then, should Israel allow representatives of these countries into Ramallah to make political statements that could inflame tensions and further undercut Israel in the international arena?
Far from serving Israel’s interests, facilitating this visit would have actively undermined them.
This is especially true as June shapes up to be one of the more diplomatically challenging months Israel has faced since the war began. The upcoming French-Saudi conference in New York is likely to rejuvenate calls for a Palestinian state based on the 1967 lines, with East Jerusalem as its capital. That’s not a framework Israel is prepared to accept — and it need not play along.
Not allowing the foreign ministers to visit was one way for Israel to try to prevent the move from picking up steam.
Another option being floated in Jerusalem is a more muscular countermeasure: declaring that unilateral recognition of Palestinian statehood will trigger Israeli unilateral responses, such as annexing certain parts of the West Bank. Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar and Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer have reportedly relayed this message to some European counterparts.
Whether or not Israel ultimately takes that step, the message is clear: if the international community is going to act unilaterally, so might Israel.
That message needs to be delivered forcefully because Israel’s diplomatic isolation, exacerbated by the war in Gaza and its humanitarian toll, has emboldened key players like France and Saudi Arabia to try to dictate terms. Jerusalem cannot allow that to happen.
Blocking the visit to Ramallah is one way to push back. It sends a signal that Israel is not going to stand by quietly while others try to predetermine its security needs and future.
Partial annexation — as a warning or a reality — may be another.
In this environment, symbolism matters. High-profile diplomatic visits carry weight, and so does denying them. Israel has made it clear: it will not be a passive participant in a process it fundamentally rejects and believes will endanger its security, certainly not in the shadow of October 7.
