Since US President Donald Trump’s return to office on January 20, much has been written about the renewed closeness in ties between Washington and Jerusalem.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gave voice to this dynamic during his visit to the White House just two weeks after Trump’s inauguration, saying, “I’ve said this before and I’ll say it again: You are the greatest friend Israel has ever had in the White House.”
Trump, for his part, said just two weeks ago after a phone conversation with Netanyahu: “We are on the same side of every issue.”
That’s what made Tuesday’s announcement in Washington so jarring.
Just one week before Trump embarks on a high-profile trip to the Gulf—stopping in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, but notably skipping Israel—Trump revealed that Washington had reached an agreement with the Houthis. The deal: the US would halt its airstrikes on Yemen, and the Houthis would stop targeting commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
US goes after its own interests, leaving Jerusalem confused
The announcement came only 48 hours after a Houthi ballistic missile landed near Ben-Gurion Airport, prompting airlines to once again cancel flights to Israel, and hours after the Israeli Air Force destroyed Sanaa’s international airport—and hit several other sites in Yemen’s capital—in retaliation.
What stung even more in Jerusalem was the Houthis’ follow-up declaration that their operations against Israel would continue as long as the war in Gaza persisted.
The impression in Jerusalem? That the US had secured its own interests, ensuring Red Sea commerce flows uninterrupted, while leaving Israel to deal with the Houthis alone. This wasn’t the first time. Just weeks earlier, the administration began quiet negotiations with Iran, once again against Israel’s wishes.
All of this is feeding a perception that for all the warmth in rhetoric and symbolism, when American and Israeli interests diverge—as they inevitably will—Trump barely takes Israel into account.
As former National Security Advisor Giora Eiland said in a Kan Bet interview, “I think that in our relations with the US, we are at a low point that is hidden from the public: The US does not count us, or even worse, is working behind our back.”
That sense of exclusion, whether widely shared or not, is reinforced as Trump prepares for his Gulf tour, which he has hyped by saying it will be preceded by “a very, very big announcement … as big as it gets.”
That Trump is traveling to the region and not including Israel—unlike his first term when his maiden foreign trip, which was also to Saudi Arabia, included a stop in Jerusalem—speaks volumes. This trip is not about Israel: If it were, he’d be coming here.
Still, that doesn’t mean Israel won’t be affected. Trump is stepping into a region convulsed by war, rivalry, and realignment. And while the formal focus may be investments, arms deals, and China, the discussions in Riyadh, Doha, and Abu Dhabi will touch on Gaza, Iran, normalization—and by extension, Israel—in ways that will reverberate long after Trump returns home.
NO ISSUE looms larger over Trump’s visit than the war in Gaza. It may not be on the official agenda, but it will dominate every private conversation – especially as Israel has said that it will commence a major military operation in Gaza once Trump leaves the region if a deal is not reached that secures the release of hostages.
Trump arrives in the Gulf amid concern and anger there about the humanitarian situation in Gaza, and as America’s Gulf allies are uneasy about a renewed Israeli offensive.
The president has maintained a firm pro-Israel stance on the war since coming into office, pretty much giving Netanyahu a free hand in Gaza to do what he thinks is necessary, and resisting calls to pressure Jerusalem. But the Gulf leaders he’ll meet—who have quietly coordinated with Israel in recent years—now want a different approach. They’re pushing the US to rein in what they call Israel’s “unchecked campaign,” press for a ceasefire, and expand humanitarian aid.
Behind closed doors, they’re expected to urge Trump to broker a deal and pressure Israel to accept it. This presents an opportunity for him: securing a temporary truce or a hostage release would let him portray himself as both a loyal ally of Israel and an effective regional broker.
But if he fails to broker such a deal, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) is expected to reiterate that normalization with Israel won’t move forward until the war ends and a path to a two-state solution reemerges. That message, echoed across the Arab world, places Trump in a bind: lean too far toward Israel, and risk losing Arab support; lean too far toward the Gulf, and invite backlash from his pro-Israel supporters.
For Trump, the Abraham Accords were a crowning achievement of his first term. Now, with a second term underway and another Gulf trip in motion, he’s eyeing a bigger prize: Saudi Arabia. A normalization agreement between Riyadh and Jerusalem would reshape the region and hand Trump a major foreign policy victory. But the timing could hardly be worse.
Saudi officials have made their position clear: as long as the war in Gaza rages, there will be no peace deal with Israel. Arab public opinion has hardened, and MBS—once seen as open to normalization—isn’t likely to advance talks while images from Rafah and Khan Yunis dominate regional headlines. Even the UAE, which formalized ties with Israel in 2020, has pulled back its public embrace.
Still, normalization isn’t off the table—it’s just postponed. Trump’s aim in Riyadh won’t be to sign a deal, but to gauge what might be possible down the road. He’s expected to press MBS on what it would take to restart normalization talks once the fighting stops.
That might include US defense guarantees, a civilian nuclear deal, or an Israeli commitment to a political horizon for the Palestinians. The trip won’t deliver a breakthrough—but it could lay groundwork. Israel’s concern is that Trump, keen on getting Saudi investments, may be willing to strike numerous security deals with the kingdom even as the Saudis continue to distance themselves from normalization.One thing is clear: the Abraham Accords are no longer just about the UAE or Bahrain. The next chapter runs through Saudi Arabia. Trump knows it won’t be written on this trip—but he’s hoping to draft the outline.
HOVERING JUST beyond Gaza is the deeper strategic question hanging over Trump’s mee5tings in the Gulf: Iran.
For both Israel and the Gulf monarchies, Tehran remains the central threat. But while many in Israel see this as the best opportunity in decades to strike a physical blow at Iran, the Gulf countries—concerned that this would drag them into a war and that Tehran would retaliate against them—are more receptive to the diplomatic path that Trump has embarked on.
The president is currently pursuing a dual-track approach: maintaining pressure on Tehran through sanctions and military posturing, while quietly probing whether a new nuclear understanding is possible.
In the Gulf he will be seeking Arab buy-in.
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi will likely stress the need for deterrence against Iran on the one hand, while endorsing a diplomatic path on the other—one that curbs uranium enrichment and reins in Iranian regional behavior without appearing to reward the regime. If such a deal can be structured, they’re open to it. What they fear is being caught in the crossfire if such a deal falls apart.
NO foreign visit by Trump is complete without a dollar figure—and this one is no exception. At the center of his Gulf tour is a straightforward proposition: bring home big numbers. Whether it’s trillion-dollar investment pledges, arms deals, or joint ventures in tech and energy, the president wants deliverables he can hold up as proof that “America First” still delivers.
The Gulf states, eager to hedge their bets in a volatile world, have responded. Saudi Arabia has pledged up to $600 billion in US-bound investments over Trump’s second term. The UAE has floated an even larger figure—$1.4 trillion—targeting artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and natural gas infrastructure.
For Gulf leaders, the investments are not just about economic return—they’re about leverage. Pouring money into the US deepens their stake in stable ties with Washington and signals alignment at a time when China is also courting them with infrastructure proposals and tech deals.
For Trump, the trip will be a success if it ends with splashy announcements about mega-deals. The optics of these deals are critical for him politically, because while the visit is framed as foreign policy, the subtext is unmistakably domestic.
WITH TRUMP’S approval ratings at his 100-day mark at historic lows for a newly re-elected president—and political headaches mounting over inflation, tariffs, and legislative gridlock—he is turning to the one arena where a president has wide latitude and instant positive publicity: the world stage.
He’s not the first to try – presidents looking for wins often look to the Middle East. But history shows limited political payoff. Jimmy Carter brought Egypt and Israel together, but couldn’t survive the Iran hostage crisis and economic malaise, and lost to Ronald Reagan in 1980. George H.W. Bush led the US to victory in the Gulf War—and lost re-election a year later in 1992. Even Trump himself signed the Abraham Accords just weeks before the 2020 election—and still lost.
Yet the appeal endures. Trump believes his base responds to shows of strength and bold moves abroad. With trillion-dollar investment pledges and potential breakthroughs on hostages or arms sales, his team sees the trip as a chance to change the narrative: from domestic drift to global leadership.
It’s also a chance to regain control of the foreign policy story. With criticism over his handling of Iran and Russia, Trump wants to be seen as decisive—cutting deals, not dithering. If he can deliver even modest wins, he may be able to reframe the conversation back home.
This visit signals that the US is not retreating from the Middle East, but recalibrating. Less boots on the ground, more burden-sharing. Fewer speeches, more transactions. Whether this new model delivers long-term stability remains to be seen.
For Israel, the significance of Trump’s Gulf tour won’t lie in the size of the investment pledges or the optics of handshake diplomacy. It will hinge on whether the trip strengthens deterrence against Iran, builds on the strategic realignment launched by the Abraham Accords, and keeps Jerusalem at the center of Washington’s Middle East calculus—rather than drifting toward the periphery.
