In 2008, the United States Congress codified into law America’s longstanding commitment to maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge, requiring the president to continually assess whether that superiority is being preserved.
The legislation defines QME as “the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damages and casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in sufficient quantity.”
Over the years, there have been ups and downs, but for the most part, Israel’s QME has been maintained. When Saudi Arabia, for example, wanted to purchase F-15 fighter jets in the late 1970s, it received models slightly less advanced than those provided to Israel. When Egypt bought F-16s, the story was the same.
This policy continued for years: Israel would receive one version of a system, while its neighbors would get a slightly downgraded variant, perhaps with a less sophisticated radar or electronic warfare suite. Some countries were sold jets that couldn’t be fitted with specialized systems, while Israel received approval to install its own unique modifications.
Though not always smooth, the QME principle was largely upheld – until this week, which ended with growing concern in Israel over the implications of massive new arms deals signed by the United States with both Saudi Arabia and, separately, Turkey. Among the advanced weapons that reportedly could be included in the packages is the F-35, an aircraft currently operated in the Middle East solely by the Israel Air Force.
The F-35 is no ordinary fighter jet. As a fifth-generation multirole combat aircraft with stealth capabilities, it functions as a networked system, connecting all participating aircraft and enabling unprecedented interoperability. This applies not only among Israeli jets but also between allied forces operating in the same theater.
Now, imagine Turkey receiving the F-35. Yes, Turkey is a NATO member, but it is also led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a leader who just a few weeks ago openly called for Israel’s destruction. Would Israel feel secure knowing that a country whose leader seeks its annihilation is now flying the world’s most advanced combat jet?
What if Israel had managed the Gaza war differently?
THIS BRINGS us to another pressing issue. On September 30, 2027, just over two years from now, the current memorandum of understanding under which Israel receives $3.8 billion annually in US military aid will expire. The 10-year, $38b. The agreement was signed in 2016 by then-President Barack Obama, though it only went into effect after Trump began his first term.
At the time, there was a debate in Israel over whether to finalize the MOU with Obama or wait and see whether Trump or Hillary Clinton would win the election. Netanyahu ultimately chose Obama for one simple reason: He knew what he was getting.
While he was fairly confident Clinton would strike a deal, Trump was an enigma. With his “America First” policy, Israeli defense officials feared that securing a generous MOU under Trump might prove more difficult.Fast forward to 2021, under President Joe Biden. Although six years remained in the existing MOU, some in the Israeli government pushed to begin talks on a new one.
The rationale was straightforward: Biden was a known quantity, a proven supporter of Israel, and could be counted on to offer a deal equal to or even better than Obama’s.
Then-defense minister Benny Gantz initiated quiet discussions with the Pentagon and the Biden administration. But those efforts were cut short when the Bennett-led government collapsed after just a year.
When Netanyahu returned to power, his government did not prioritize renewing the MOU. By the time it was ready to begin negotiations, October 7 had happened.
Now, practically speaking, any new MOU will have to be negotiated with Trump. The question is: Can Israel get it done? If so, it must start working on it now.
Opinions within the Israeli government are divided.
Some believe Trump will agree to a new MOU, and that, especially now, with the QME under threat, this presents an opportunity to secure an even larger aid package for a longer period. There is no question that support exists in Congress. The main hurdle will be the Trump administration itself.
But others are skeptical. Trump is transactional. He favors countries that invest in the US, like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, which just signed lucrative deals this week. He prefers partners who bring money to America over those seeking American funding.
THAT MAY explain why Netanyahu told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee this week that it might be time for Israel to start weaning itself off US military aid.
If Netanyahu were confident that the aid would continue, why suggest moving away from it, especially at a time when Israel’s defense needs are only growing? If, however, he suspects the aid won’t be renewed, it would be politically smart to claim the decision was his rather than admit that Trump denied it.
There are legitimate arguments for phasing out American military aid: diversifying weapons suppliers, boosting domestic defense manufacturing, and enhancing strategic independence. But such a shift must be part of a comprehensive and deliberate strategy. This isn’t something to decide impulsively, especially amid the current chaos.
Israel is still at war. It is working to bring home the remaining hostages. It’s being sidelined in regional diplomacy. And it now faces a genuine threat to its QME.
And if that were not enough, on Wednesday, we witnessed the historic meeting in Riyadh between Trump and Syria’s jihadist-turned-statesman, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Looking at the images, it was hard not to ask: What if?What if Israel had managed the Gaza war differently – secured a hostage deal when it was possible, ended the fighting sooner, and advanced a political resolution that would install a new governing entity in Gaza? Would Netanyahu have been in that room with Trump, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Sharaa (with Erdogan joining by video)?
Could Israel have been part of a historic normalization with Saudi Arabia and, perhaps, even the beginnings of a diplomatic process with Syria? Would Israeli companies have been among those benefiting from the trillions in trade deals now being signed between the US, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar?
Instead, Israel was absent. It watched as a former jihadist was embraced by Trump, as sanctions on Syria were lifted, and as Erdogan, who only recently called for Israel’s destruction, presided over the moment.
Here’s the tragic twist: Had Israel not defeated Hezbollah and weakened Iran’s regional influence, Sharaa likely wouldn’t have been able to take over Syria. Israel helped shape this new Middle East. But now, it’s not even in the room.
The writer is a co-author of a forthcoming book, While Israel Slept, about the October 7 Hamas attacks, a senior fellow at the JPPI, and a former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post.
