The IDF's Southern Command's Northern Brigade was found largely responsible for the failures in protecting Sderot during Hamas's October 7 Massacre, an IDF probe published on Wednesday found.
The probe found that the IDF has "misguided concepts and failed" and that "there is full responsibility from the Northern Brigade." According to the investigator, "Sderot is within the operational area of the Northern Brigade. On October 7, no force from the brigade arrived."
"The IDF had misguided concepts and failures over the years that placed the operational end in a situation it couldn’t prevent. The responsibility lies with the Northern Brigade, the Gaza Division, and the Operations Division. Misguided concepts for years," he added.
Commander of IDF Southern Command's Northern Brigade, Col. Haim Cohen, submitted his resignation letter from the IDF late in March.
During fighting in Sderot, the largest city near the Gaza border, 41 Hamas terrorists infiltrated the city, 39 were killed, and two were captured. Before being killed, they murdered 53 Israelis, including 37 civilians, 11 police officers, three IDF soldiers, and two firefighters, the probe confirmed.
Nukhba terrorists first infiltrated Sderot at 6:59 a.m., 30 minutes after the infiltration into Israel began. This was followed by a second infiltration at 7:01 a.m. and a third at 7:30 a.m.
IDF forces did not arrive until 8:30 a.m., the probe noted.
IDF forces eventually gained operational control of Sderot at 10:30 a.m. on October 7, and complete control with an end to the fighting at 8:30 a.m. on October 8, the probe added.
The Northern Brigade, particularly troops of the 77th Battalion, were responsible for guarding the entrance points to Sderot, and were armed with two or three tanks.
The probe also found that 10 rockets were launched on Sderot between 6:29 and 7:15 a.m., with 41 rockets in total launched towards the town on October 7.
Approximately 800 soldiers were involved in defending Sderot, with the probe investigator adding that there may have been more than 1,000, including Border Police, Israel Police, and senior IDF commanders. However, the investigator later clarified that this number signifies total mobilization over the period, and there were not this many fighting at the same time.
Communications difficulties
The probe found that forming a situational picture at all levels, local military operations centers, the IDF command, the Northern Brigade, etc., was "very difficult due to collapsed control systems and the impact of Hamas terrorists on communication systems and military bases, such as Re'im."
Further, "the IDF didn’t understand the overall situation in the Gaza border communities." the investigator noted.
The probe noted that the Palestinian infiltration warning successfully sounded and "got everyone out," but that the standby unit in Sderot did not have long-range weapons for fighting due to a lack of weapons storage in the town caused by bureaucratic issues.
A question was asked of the investigator concerning this, and the investigator confirmed that the IDF Operations Directorate ordered that if there is no weapons storage in the town, residents should be "disarmed." This led to the standby security unit going to fight off Nukhba terrorists with their personal handguns.
The investigator also informed that "in the two years prior to October 7, there was no training for the standby unit for such scenarios," adding, "The responsibility of the IDF and Northern Brigade was to ensure that the standby units were prepared. Sderot does not have a preparation file like other settlements, and this is a major issue. The IDF is responsible for readiness."
Lessons and conclusions
The probe found that the IDF failed in its mission to protect Sderot on October 7. This was in part because the military was "not prepared for a wide surprise raid."
They had no depth of defense at a brigade, battalion, or company level, with all defense of the town relying on the security fence.
The probe recommended that "Rapid solutions for large-scale raids were necessary and that Sderot must also receive a permanent force to protect it."
Another finding was that the communications systems at the time were inadequate, including a scenario where the Northern Brigade did not update the IDF 13th Battalion about one of the infiltrations because "it was not within their sector."
There was no unified system coordinating between different organizations and forces, which led to a large number of forces being concentrated in Sderot at the expense of other towns, villages, and kibbutzim, the probe added.
"Sderot's mayor was not aware of the standby unit and its weaknesses. The security officer was the one communicating between the mayor and the Northern Brigade. He spoke with the brigade commander and the Gaza Division, and there was the district commander who was connected to the battalion. From my conversation with him, the mayor was unaware of the entire security system in his city, which was weak," the investigator clarified.
The probe also found that "had a warning been issued to the city when the terrorists first infiltrated the area inside the security fence, it would have been possible to set up blocking forces at key points at the city entrances and thwart enemy attacks."
Security arrangements were "insufficient," and the IDF's standing orders did "not align" with Sderot's characteristics.
There was also no synchronization between the deployment of IDF and Israel Police forces, including a major gap in communication between the IDF, Home Front Command, Border Police, and Sderot municipality, partly due to a lack of a joint command center, even after the infiltration began.
The probe also found that there was no communication between the IDF's Operations Directorate, and the Gaza Division, leading to a lack of Frontal Supervision Points, which would allow combat troops to receive orders and directions in captured territory.
The investigator was asked what lessons have been learned and what changes have been made, and informed that In addition to increasing the strength of the army in the Northern and Southern Brigades, some of the security components have been improved. The readiness and preparedness of the standby units were enhanced. There are now boulders rising from the road to block the entrances at junctions."
"In addition to increasing the IDF’s forces in the Northern and Southern Brigades, there is now a security zone that no one is supposed to enter, creating a depth of defense," he added.
When questioned if this was changed within Sderot itself, he answered, "Some of the security components have been improved, including the number of forces present, the standby units, and their readiness. There is also a process of setting up various blockages in the city, at the entrances."
"Not gates, but various types of bollards. Posts that rise from the road and block the passage. Including cameras added there, larger forces have been deployed, and currently, there is a very large force guarding Sderot," he clarified.
Sderot Police Station
The probe found that 26 Nukhba Force terrorists infiltrated Sderot in two vans, killing Mor Gabbai in an armored vehicle at Sderot Junction.
They then reached Yitzhak Shamir junction with two vans, and another vehicle, capturing a mother and daughter from the Nahal Oz junction. They had been hit by terrorist gunfire, with a woman holding her daughter, who was uninjured. These two women were eventually rescued from Sderot police station, where the terrorists were holding them.
Upon entering the city, the terrorists shot at two police officers who were exiting the police station, one of whom died on the spot. Another officer was murdered, while terrorists gained control of the outside and first floor of the police station.
At 7:10 a.m., terrorists ascended to the second floor of the police station, and attempted to breach the roof. Additional terrorists guarding the station entered but were unable to reach the roof.
Four terrorists were killed by one of the police officers.
The officers reported that they had fortified the remaining sections of the police station and called for aid.
At 7:20 a.m., the first police forces arrived at the station to relieve those inside. By 7:32 a.m., a rescue team of six police officers had organized to rescue those trapped on the roof, reaching the station's staircase and coming under heavy gunfire.
At 8:37 a.m., a second police relief team entered the station, scanning the second floor for remaining terrorists. One police officer from this team was killed. Officers remained trapped upstairs as the rescue team was unable to ascend further, requiring additional assistance.
At 9 a.m., the police Counterterrorism Unit arrived and took command of the operation.
By 9.52 a.m., they had breached the station and rescued the injured.
At 1:30 p.m., firefighters arrived with a crane, and helped to evacuate the police officers trapped inside.
At 2 p.m., a decision was made to breach the second floor, and rescue a police officer hiding there. After they began descending to the first floor, they encountered more terrorists, and an officer was killed.
From 4 p.m., the police Counterterrorism Unit established a siege of the police station.
In the evening, the remaining terrorists attempted to escape, but were all killed.
At 10:37 p.m., a flare was fired at the station, followed by gunfire at 11:35 p.m., to eliminate any remaining terrorists.
The terrorists continued to attempt to escape during the night, but were all killed as the Counterterrorism Unit scanned the station.
The industrial zone
Nine terrorists infiltrated at 7:01 a.m., and had killed 13 retirees by 7:03 a.m.
At 7:28 a.m., terrorists entered the Mall 7 shopping area, but failed to break into a gas station where 11 civilians were hiding at 7:29 a.m.
At 7:34 a.m., the police Counterterrorism Unit encountered terrorists, killing three, with more fleeing.
Soldiers from the IDF's Yahalom Battalion also arrived in the area and clashed with terrorists.
A total of nine terrorists were killed in the area.
Achuzat Bayit neighborhood
By 7:30 a.m., the terrorists had infiltrated Sderot's Achuzat Bayit neighborhood. By 8:30, they had killed civilians and attempted to break into houses.
There was a "heavy" clash between the police Counterterrorism Unit and Nukhba terrorists, with the former being supported by IDF counterterror fighters, who arrived from their base on Camp Adam, near Modi'in, and aided in the fighting.
At 10:00 a.m., an additional terrorist infiltrated the neighborhood from the Erez Crossing, and failed to carry out a stabbing attack.
