Hezbollah severs outstretched hand
Nidaz Al Watan, Lebanon, April 17
An extended hand is met with severance – this is Hezbollah’s enduring equation, a principle it has embedded into its conduct for decades.
Dialog, in Hezbollah’s view, is never a pathway to mutual understanding but a tactical maneuver. Partnership is not a framework for cooperation but a platform for domination.
In Hezbollah’s lexicon, any initiative toward reconciliation is rebranded as a conspiracy that must be crushed – either through force or political subversion.
In 2006, national dialogue among political factions was swiftly followed by catastrophe, as Hezbollah unilaterally abducted Israeli soldiers, dragging the country into a devastating war that destroyed infrastructure and spilled innocent blood, bypassing all legitimate state authority. When Hezbollah joined the government and refused to honor its agreements, the May 7 clashes of Beirut and Mount Lebanon erupted – a violent episode burned into national memory. The Baabda Declaration, forged at president Michel Suleiman’s dialogue table, was barely dry before Hezbollah disavowed it, treating it as though it had never existed.
Today, President Joseph Aoun extends his hand under enormous strain, facing both international and domestic pressure to confront the illegal presence of arms in Lebanon.
His goal is to safeguard Lebanon’s military institution and uphold civil peace. Hezbollah’s response: not political dissent or legal argument, but overt threats to sever his hand – a discourse alien to democratic societies, steeped instead in fascist overtones that ignore the nation’s painful history.
Rather than reflect on its ruinous past, Hezbollah chooses escapism, brandishing the threat of chaos to manipulate public fear, whipping its supporters into frenzies of rhetoric and deflection. Meanwhile, Israel continues to escalate its warnings, emboldened by shifting power dynamics that expose Hezbollah’s so-called deterrence as a crumbling myth.
On the domestic front, Hezbollah no longer hides that its weapons are not Lebanon’s shield, but a lever for foreign agendas and a tool for internal coercion.
It is a party that does not seek common ground because it is nourished by discord and ruin.
In Hezbollah’s worldview, anyone who dares to build a state is not a partner but a traitor – someone whose outstretched hand deserves to be cut off. Unless the Lebanese people rise to reject this doctrine of sabotage and repression, the state will remain shackled, and the metaphor of severed hands will remain a grim rule imposed on any effort at national rescue. – Assaad Bechara
Sudan and the real regional danger
Al-Masry Al-Youm, Egypt, April 19
Sudan now stands at a critical crossroads, despite recent gains by the Sudanese army in reclaiming large areas of territory it had previously lost, including parts of the capital, Khartoum.
The ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces, led by Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces, under the command of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, is not only one of the bloodiest but also one of the most complex wars currently unfolding in the region. Its consequences are not confined to Sudan’s borders; rather, they pose a serious threat to the stability of the broader region.
The prolonged civil war has laid the groundwork for one of the most alarming security transformations in the Horn of Africa: the potential evolution of Sudan into a fertile breeding ground for armed factions and militias driven by extremist ideologies.
The near-total collapse of state institutions, the fragmentation of security agencies, and the absence of a functioning central authority capable of asserting control across the country have created ideal conditions for radical groups that thrive in environments defined by political disintegration and security vacuums. Experiences in Libya, Syria, and Somalia have demonstrated that such conditions often catalyze the rise of jihadist or ultranationalist factions that embed themselves in marginalized, impoverished communities, exploiting social grievances and a lack of governance to bolster their ranks.
Sudan’s vast geography and the difficulty of monitoring its porous borders – especially in such regions as Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile – further exacerbate the situation, making the country increasingly susceptible to infiltration by weapons smugglers and human trafficking networks.
This ease of movement facilitates the transit and entrenchment of extremist cells, often originating from other regional flashpoints in the Sahel or the Horn of Africa. The danger escalates with the growing presence of tribal militias, some of which employ religious rhetoric to mobilize their constituencies, thus blurring the line between sectarian loyalty and ideological extremism in the absence of centralized oversight.
More troubling still is the possibility that these groups could attract financial and logistical support from external actors seeking to exploit Sudan’s chaos to serve their strategic agendas. Such developments could transform Sudan into a new theater of proxy warfare and sectarian conflict, endangering the security of neighboring states, including Egypt, Chad, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, while also threatening key maritime routes in the Red Sea.
International organizations and United Nations agencies have repeatedly sounded the alarm about this trajectory. They warn that if the conflict continues without decisive international engagement, Sudan risks following the path of “Somalization” – a scenario in which the state fragments into zones controlled by competing militias, some of which may adopt extremist ideologies that could destabilize not just the region, but international security more broadly.
A January 2024 report from the UN Security Council explicitly warned of Sudan’s potential to become a “safe haven for terrorists” if the war is not halted and efforts to restore a civil state are not urgently initiated.
One of the gravest implications of the Sudanese conflict is that it poses a dual threat. Not only could the country collapse or fracture irreparably, but it could also emerge as a new epicenter for terrorism in Africa.
This underscores the urgent need for a coordinated regional and international response – one that goes beyond humanitarian relief to include sustainable political and security strategies aimed at stabilizing the country, restoring governance, and preventing the rise of violent extremism. – Abdel Latif El-Menawy
Integrating Hezbollah into the Lebanese army?
An-Nahar, Lebanon, April 18
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun recently announced his intention to lead a direct dialogue with Hezbollah’s leadership regarding the transfer of its weapons to legitimate state authorities. He also expressed support for the integration of Hezbollah members into the national military establishment – not as an autonomous resistance force akin to the Popular Mobilization Forces, but as part of the state’s official defense apparatus. This initiative is a key component of President Aoun’s broader efforts to resolve the ongoing dilemma of Hezbollah’s weapons, which continues to obstruct reconstruction efforts and delay the flow of international aid.
Reports suggest that the Lebanese army has already quietly begun collecting weapons from certain Hezbollah sites, out of the public eye in order to avoid political embarrassment. However, the issue of integrating Hezbollah members into the armed forces poses a significant and complex challenge, both domestically and internationally – one that may not have been fully anticipated by the president’s advisory team and must be urgently addressed.
The Lebanese army has a relatively successful track record in absorbing former militia members following the civil war and the implementation of the Taif Agreement in the early 1990s.
At that time, Hezbollah’s weapons were exempted due to regional arrangements brokered by the late Syrian president Hafez Assad, under the justification that they were necessary for resisting the Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon.
The militias that were integrated into the army at the time were secular in nature, with nationalist leanings on both the Right and Left. Their fighters underwent training focused on discipline, adherence to military hierarchy, and alignment with the Lebanese army’s doctrine.
Hezbollah, however, is fundamentally different. It is an ideological party rooted in armed Shi’ite political Islam, established by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG) as part of a broader regional project that has extended far beyond Lebanon’s borders over the past four decades.
Many of Hezbollah’s youth have been raised from childhood in party-run institutions, indoctrinated with loyalty to the supreme leader of Iran. These cadres have played a key role in militarizing Shi’ite movements across the Arab world, particularly since 2004.
The use of religious doctrine to justify violence within Shi’ite political Islam is not fundamentally different from its Sunni counterpart. Both rely on religious rulings and fatwas issued by clerical authorities deemed legitimate by their respective movements.
In Sunni jihadist groups like al-Qaida and ISIS, fighters pledge allegiance to an emir or religious figure who sanctions acts of violence, including suicide bombings, promising divine reward.
Hezbollah’s system is more structured but mirrors the same ideological framework. What are locally known as “religious mandates” are issued to fighters, defining their mission and assuring martyrdom status in the event of death.
Hezbollah’s leaders have openly acknowledged their allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader and their organic ties to the IRGC. Militant political Islam – whether Sunni or Shi’ite – rejects national borders in favor of transnational religious unity, with ultimate objectives such as reestablishing the caliphate or expanding the Islamic nation according to each sect’s interpretation.
Globally, there is no precedent for rehabilitating and integrating members of armed ideological Islamist groups into a national army, particularly in a country like Lebanon, which has endured decades of sectarian strife.
Has the Lebanese army command developed a concrete plan for such integration?
How can young Hezbollah members be transformed from ideological foot soldiers of the mullahs into disciplined military personnel who accept orders only from the Lebanese chain of command, without deference to external religious authorities?
Will Lebanese Shi’ite clerics be recruited to support this transformation?
Since 2001, as part of the global war on terror and the emergence of al-Qaida and later ISIS, Western and Arab states have focused on confronting armed Sunni political Islam. The Lebanese army has engaged in multiple confrontations with Sunni militant groups in Tripoli, Sidon, and the outskirts of Arsal.
These groups were defeated, many of their members imprisoned, and Lebanon’s security services continue to monitor and detain suspects affiliated with them – hundreds remain incarcerated without trial.
How, then, can Sunni political Islamists in Lebanon justify the inclusion of Hezbollah members in the same army that has persecuted them for decades? This question is particularly sensitive in Lebanon’s sectarian political system and must not be overlooked.
Furthermore, the new Syrian regime and its military forces are themselves born of Sunni political Islam, raising the potential for future complications if Hezbollah fighters are absorbed into the Lebanese army.
Most Arab countries – and especially the Gulf states – have rejected both Sunni and Shi’ite manifestations of armed political Islam.
Even Western powers that once cooperated with Shi’ite militias now classify many of them, including Hezbollah, as terrorist organizations and are actively working to dismantle their influence as part of broader efforts to contain Iran’s regional reach. Therefore, despite the good intentions and theoretical appeal of integrating Hezbollah’s armed wing into the Lebanese military, the initiative carries significant risks and red flags that must be taken seriously to prevent future instability. – Riad Kahwaji
Trump’s trillions and Palestine
Asharq Al-Awsat, London, April 18
There is speculation about US President Donald Trump’s anticipated visit to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf next month, framing it around a promised $3 trillion and suggesting it may be tied to political concessions involving Gaza, a potential Palestinian state, Yemen, and Iran.
First, it’s important to clarify that these are commercial agreements – encompassing civilian, military, and investment deals – not political bargaining chips. If the Palestinian cause could be resolved in monetary terms, it would have been the most expensive cause in history. Had the creation of a Palestinian state been attainable through a billion or even a trillion dollars, it would have happened long ago, and the region would have paid that price. Political settlements and economic deals often follow separate forms of logic, and they rarely align neatly.
As for the costs and losses associated with the Palestinian cause, the billions spent since the 1960s have produced minimal tangible political gains for the Palestinian people. Spending has continued since the wars [against Israel] of 1967 [Six Day War] and 1973 [Yom Kippur War], alongside decades of financial aid to the Palestinian Authority, Fatah, and Hamas, and the vast sums that Arab states have invested in military buildups to confront Israel. Add to that the devastation inflicted on Lebanon and Syria, as well as the financial damage to sectors like infrastructure, tourism, agriculture, and industry in the context of Hezbollah and Hamas’ repeated confrontations with Israel over the past three decades – it all adds up to trillions of dollars, far surpassing the value of Trump’s anticipated deals with the Gulf for economic projects in the years ahead.
The promised $3 trillion is earmarked to serve the interests of the Gulf states, whose top priority, as in every other government in the world, is the well-being of their citizens – not the Palestinian issue or any other external matter. These deals are designed to accelerate economic development, infrastructure expansion, and long-term growth programs.
Meanwhile, Iran has spent tens of billions since 1980 on regional conflicts, funneling its citizens’ wealth into wars in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and Yemen, and financing proxy networks across the globe. After four decades, Iran has not liberated a single inch of Palestine, nor has it preserved the influence it built in Lebanon or elsewhere. The cumulative cost of these activities – when combined with the losses from international sanctions and missed economic opportunities – easily exceeds a trillion dollars, much of it wasted, resulting in hardship and decline for the Iranian people.
In contrast, the trillion-dollar deals between the Gulf and Trump, while staggering in scale, are directed toward transformative infrastructure projects, with meaningful returns for the Gulf’s future. Portions of them are targeted investments in US markets. Trump is not alone in using high-stakes deal-making to advance national interests – every global leader does it, though not with his characteristic bravado. Like the US, countries such as China, Japan, and members of the European Union pursue robust trade relationships with aligned partners, though often through quieter diplomacy.
The Trump administration, by contrast, has been unapologetically blunt, even with longstanding allies in Europe, Japan, and South Korea, frequently criticizing trade imbalances and burden-sharing in alliances, such as NATO. Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the United States is both strategic and reciprocal – a partnership that has endured for over 80 years and consistently served regional stability best when anchored in dialogue and cooperation.
The trillion-dollar figure is not a donation – it represents planned expenditures over several years on major initiatives currently under negotiation, including nuclear energy development, liquefied natural gas exports, and joint military manufacturing within the kingdom. – Abdulrahman Al-Rashed
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.
