The Defense Ministry's Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)'s head Maj.-Gen. Ghassan Alian disseminated the "Hudna Plan," on June 11, 2023, which effectively recognized Hamas's rule of the Gaza Strip, granting sovereignty to the terror organization, N12 reported, releasing photographs of the documents for the first time.
This was less than four months before the terror group carried out the October 7 massacre.
At a May 2023 meeting in Cairo with representatives of Shin Bet and the IDF, including Alian, Cairo presented a proposal for a hudna (ceasefire) with Hamas.
After the delegation returned, COGAT set up a think tank with representatives from Shin Bet and Southern Command, where the "Hudna Plan" was finalized.
It was then sent to then-defense minister Yoav Gallant and aimed to promote a long-term arrangement with Hamas terrorists on their control of the Gaza Strip, N12 reported.
COGAT, at the time, believed that 2021's Operation Guardian of the Walls led to establishing a real deterrrance. The prevailing view was that there was a distinction between the attitudes and actions of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, with the latter acting as the main belligerent in 2021.
This added to a perception that Hamas had acted responsibly as a governing body by refraining from joining the fighting.
In the same document, COGAT proposed "de facto acceptance of Hamas rule, and granting it permission to consolidate its influence in the Palestinian arena, along with expanding its regional ties," N12 revealed.
A day after this plan was circulated internally within the IDF and defense establishment senior figures, a discussion titled "The Security Regime in the Gaza Strip" was held, attended by all senior IDF commanders, as well as other senior officials.
At the meeting's conclusion, the then-chief of staff, Lt.-Gen Herzi Halevi, recommended a broad proposal for a hudna and gave a directive on engaging with mediators.
A month later, the Cabinet convened for its first discussion on Gaza, with the National Security Council presenting plans, which included efforts to preserve long-term calm and explore sustainable stability solutions.
At the conclusion of this meeting, it was decided to advance a civilian agreement with Hamas, provided that Israel's demands were met according to COGAT's phased framework outlines.
Hamas had deceived them
However, at that time, Hamas's then-leader, Yahya Sinwar, had already set the date for the massacre, N12 added.
The terror group's "dialogue" with Israel was, in fact, a deliberate deception and part of a broader plan conceived by Sinwar back in April 2022, we have since learned through improved intelligence.
Hamas's strategy was to appear to pursue a diplomatic arrangement while secretly preparing for the massacre, ensuring that Israel remained blinded by a false perception of negotiating a cooperation agreement.
At the time, UNRWA played a key role in transferring funds to Gaza, with approximately $160 million transferred annually for over a decade.
A COGAT document from 2015 showed that Israel facilitated the transfer of $13.5 million in cash to pay UNRWA staff's salaries. Israel also continued supporting UNRWA even when US President Trump halted funding in 2018.
Israel, according to N12, assumed or believed that UNRWA was working as a stabilizing factor. Netanyahu worked to ensure that UNRWA, who, in hindsight, evidence shows took part in the massacre and hid rockets under their schools.
COGAT and Gallant's responses
COGAT commented on the documents, stating that they operate "to implement the political leadership's policy in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip," N12 added.
The documents from 2023 "reflect an Egyptian proposal from June 2023, not an independent Israeli initiative," COGAT added, stating that "In this case too, discussions were held in accordance with political directives.”
Then-defense minister Yoav Gallant commented that "A state commission of inquiry must be established to investigate everything that occurred at least during the decade leading up to October 7. It must investigate me and all the political and military figures who held relevant positions."
PMO response
"In September 2023, following fence protests initiated by Hamas, the terror group submitted an extensive list of demands for a long-term arrangement, including economic incentives and infrastructure projects in Gaza," the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) claims.
"In a series of discussions chaired by the Prime Minister, all security chiefs expressed support for advancing understandings with Hamas and examining a long-term arrangement that would ensure stability," PMO clarified.
"The chief of staff assessed that escalation was not desirable and that improving Gaza’s economy aligned with Israeli interests. The Shin Bet head determined that Hamas had no interest in another round of fighting. The defense minister similarly concluded that improving Gaza’s economy was in Israel’s interest," PMO added.
Netanyahu "concluded that Hamas’s demands should be rejected and only approved a limited increase in worker permits – in line with the minimal recommendation presented by COGAT – alongside preparations to target Hamas leadership in Gaza," according to the PMO.
"At no point did the Prime Minister instruct the promotion of long-term negotiations or additional economic incentives beyond this," they added.
In formally conversing with the Shin Bet chief on October 4, 2023, Netanyahu stated "Restoring calm along the fence through understandings with Hamas – without significant Israeli concessions – is an achievement that should be leveraged to promote deeper arrangements, with the involvement of regional and international actors, and with generous civil and infrastructure-related benefits to Gaza."
In an October 5 discussion with Shin Bet, a long-term arrangement was recommended, including humanitarian relief measures as a goodwill gesture to initiate talks, but these recommendations were never presented for a decision or approved by Netanyahu, the PMO commented.
