On October 6, 2023, Israel was as divided as ever.
Tens of thousands demonstrated against the government’s judicial reform plan every Saturday night. Air force reservists declared they would not report for duty. Doctors, tech entrepreneurs, and the upwardly mobile were talking about leaving the country and joining WhatsApp groups dedicated to that purpose.
Then Hamas invaded, and all that – at least temporarily – melted away. When the army sent out emergency call-up notices, everyone responded. Even those who weren’t summoned showed up to push back the enemy, repel them across the border, and take the battle to them.
This was the ultimate war of “no choice.” Israel was brutally and viciously attacked and had no alternative but to respond with overwhelming force. No one questioned Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision to bomb Gaza by air and then launch a ground invasion. It was seen as the only course of action.
Nobody said Netanyahu went to war for political reasons – to shift public focus from the judicial reform debate or to quell the protests.
It was clear: Israel attacked because it had to. Soldiers were willing to risk their lives because they realized that this was a war of no choice – either Israel fights and wins, or the country’s existence is in peril. That conviction – that there were no ulterior motives and no choice but to fight – was vital and contributed to the staggering mobilization rates and battlefield successes.
Sense of necessity no longer shared by Israelis
But now, as Israel enters a new stage of the war – marked by Tuesday’s surprise bombing in Gaza – that same sense of necessity is no longer universally shared by Israelis. As a result, the national unity that accompanied the first military actions in Gaza in October 2023 is no longer in the air.
First, there are the hostages who have returned – like Yarden Bibas – urging Israel not to reengage in the fighting, knowing from personal experience it will worsen conditions for the 22 to 24 remaining captives believed to be alive.
Then there are the hostages’ families or at least some of them – this is not a monolithic group as is often portrayed in the media – who fear renewed fighting will endanger their loved ones or lead Hamas to kill them.
And then there are Netanyahu’s critics – those who always assume the absolute worst about his motives – who are shouting from every microphone and at every protest that this sudden escalation is less about rescuing hostages and more about saving his government.
As one hostage family put it, Netanyahu launched this operation not to return the hostages but to return Itamar Ben-Gvir and his Otzma Yehudit Party to the coalition. That is a grave accusation. It’s one thing for hundreds of thousands of soldiers to risk their lives to rescue hostages. It’s quite another to fight and die for the survival of a political coalition.
Netanyahu, for his part, did nothing to dispel this perception when, just hours after the bombing began, he finalized a deal to bring Otzma Yehudit and Ben-Gvir back into the government.
Even if the two events were wholly disconnected – the Gaza operation and Ben-Gvir’s return – their timing created the impression they were linked. Critics argue the strikes on Gaza were less about the hostages and more about political maneuvering.
Why is the timing so critical? Because the budget must be passed by March 31, or the government will collapse.
Without Otzma Yehudit’s support and voting for the government, Netanyahu would have a 62-58 majority – razor-thin, especially considering that three Agudat Yisrael MKs were threatening to withhold their votes if the haredi (ultra-Orthodox) conscription/exemption bill isn’t passed by then.
Bringing Ben-Gvir and his party back gives the government some much-needed breathing room. Was this Netanyahu’s calculation? There is no way to know for sure. Those inclined to defend him will say, of course not – he wouldn’t risk lives to preserve his government. Those less charitable will say, of course, it was.
What is clear is that the timing does nothing to bolster national unity or reinforce the idea that this operation was unavoidable – both essential elements when launching a major military action. On October 7, no one questioned Netanyahu’s reasons for going to war. Now, many do – undermining the sense of national purpose and solidarity that was once so clear.
