War changes societies. It breaks down old assumptions. It forces a change of priorities. It challenges deeply entrenched modi operandi.
For Israel, the war that began on October 7 upended long-standing notions of security – of what it takes to survive in this region, surrounded by enemies that both want to, and believe they can, destroy you.
And yet, in crucial ways, some things remain stubbornly unchanged.
This past week provided a striking illustration of both.
On the one hand, the country on Monday launched a major military offensive against Hamas, surprising it with a fierce aerial attack designed to send a message that the rules had changed, that Israel will not tolerate a situation where there is a ceasefire – which benefits Hamas – and none of the hostages are freed, which also benefits Hamas.
On the other, Israel’s internal political battles remain depressingly familiar, with deep divisions once again coming to the surface and threatening to overshadow the external threats the country faces.
The contradiction is glaring: a nation fighting an existential war against an enemy sworn to its destruction, yet still gripped by internal discord.
THAT CONTRADICTION was on full display this week in the statements and actions of National Unity leader Benny Gantz.
Once the face of wartime unity, he found himself straddling the country’s deepening political fault lines – condemning the government in one breath, denouncing extremists in the opposition in the next.
On Wednesday, at a Knesset Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee meeting, Gantz launched a blistering attack on the government’s decision to push forward with judicial reform, warning, during a vote on a measure to change the appointment committee for judges, of “majority tyranny” and the dangerous exploitation of power. It was the kind of rhetoric that felt taken from the heated debates of early 2023, before the war forced a pause in Israel’s political upheaval.
“There was a strategic reason why [former Hamas leader Yahya] Sinwar chose to do what he did,” Gantz said. “There was division in Israeli society, and he identified a point of weakness, like a modern Amalek. And here we are, a year and a half later, giving the same gift back. Instead of uniting, we are returning to division. Unfortunately, we’ve gone back big time to October 6.”
Gantz argued that on fundamental issues – such as the makeup of the committee that selects judges – it is not right to move ahead only because one side has the political ability to do so. Rather, consensus is needed.
For unity to exist, he said, “there is responsibility on leaders and the government to restrain themselves rather than save themselves. What we see in this process is not self-restraint but the exploitation of power. This is not majority rule but majority tyranny.”
And yet, just hours later, Gantz turned his fire on the opposition, condemning elements of the anti-government protest movement as driven more by hatred of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu than by concern for the country’s future. His shift was triggered by personal experience — being called a “traitor” at Wednesday’s demonstration in Jerusalem against Netanyahu’s intention to dismiss Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) chief Ronen Bar.
Within that crowd of protesters who care deeply about the future of the country, he said, there are those – whom he termed “barn burners,” referring to Jewish zealots during the Second Temple period who burned food storage warehouses to force the desperate population to fight the Romans – “who hate Netanyahu more than they love the country.”
This extremist minority, he said, “is no less dangerous than the extremists on the other side.”
Taken together, Gantz’s comments – both in the Knesset and at the protest – exposed a hard truth: the war may have momentarily united Israel, but it has not erased the deep fault line that existed before it.
NETANYAHU’S DECISION Sunday to fire Bar was the trigger that reignited old political battles that many had hoped the war would set aside. The political fault line remains the same: Netanyahu himself.
The reasons given for the protests this week —the firing of Bar, the demand to prioritize the return of the hostages over everything else, Qatargate – may differ. Still, at their core, the battle lines are the same as in the summer of 2023: Is Netanyahu fit to lead the country?
His opponents shout “dictator,” he shouts back “deep state,” and little seems to have changed after months of bereaved parents and returning reservists pleading, in interview after interview, for a change in this country’s political discourse.
Campaign against Hamas targets in Gaza
IF THE political fights feel like a return to prewar patterns – giving the impression that nothing has changed – militarily, things have changed dramatically. This is not only in comparison with pre-October 7, when the country’s entire security doctrine was based on a fundamentally flawed set of assumptions, but also since the war began.
On Tuesday, Israel launched an intense air campaign against Hamas targets in Gaza. The timing and scope of the strikes indicated that this newest phase of the war would be conducted differently from the previous ones.
Why?
First of all, because things have changed dramatically in Washington. The Biden administration, which often sought to rein in Israel’s military operations, is gone. The Trump administration has made clear that it understands and supports Israeli actions.
US President Donald Trump’s blunt warnings to Hamas – that “all hell will break loose” if the hostages aren’t released – signal that Israel is operating with a far freer hand than it did under Biden, when concerns over weapons shipments and losing US diplomatic backing at the UN and elsewhere tied Israel’s hands.
The broader regional picture has also changed. The US is now directly engaged in military action against the Houthis, reinforcing a wider campaign against Iran’s network of proxy forces, with Israel’s battle with Hamas seen as a key part of that campaign.
But as Houthi efforts to hit Israel this week with ballistic missiles proved, the Houthis are not simply going to buckle under the US strikes.
Internally, military leadership has changed. The appointment of Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir as IDF chief of staff has signaled a more assertive approach.
And it is showing tactically. If, after October 7, Israel’s military moves – whether to launch a ground maneuver in October or whether to go into Rafah months later – were preceded by weeks of public debate, this week was different. This time, the IAF hit Gaza in a surprise attack – one not debated endlessly in public. Likewise, tanks rolled into the Netzarim Corridor on Wednesday, and a ground maneuver began in the northern Gaza Strip on Thursday, without long-drawn-out discussions beforehand.
Also, unlike his immediate predecessor, Herzi Halevi, Zamir has indicated a willingness to take direct control over aid distribution in Gaza, a move designed to cut off Hamas’s ability to divert supplies. This shows a willingness, if needed, to get involved in the civil control of Gaza, albeit only temporarily.
Zamir has also acted swiftly in enforcing discipline among reservists refusing to serve – something Halevi hesitated to do in the judicial reform protests before October 7. This week, two reservists – a reserve navigator in the air force and a reserve Military Intelligence officer – were dismissed from the army after saying in social media posts they would not show up for reserve duty under this government.
Perhaps most significantly, Hamas itself is not the same force it was in October. It no longer has an extensive rocket arsenal – note that not until Thursday did Hamas manage to fire a rocket at Israel in response to the IDF’s escalation. By contrast, it fired some 3,000 rockets at Israel during the first four hours of October 7.
An eroding national consensus.
YET, DESPITE these battlefield advantages, Israel now faces an obstacle it did not in October: an eroding national consensus.
When the war began on October 7, there was no internal debate about the necessity to wage war in Gaza – Israel was under attack, and the country stood united. No one questioned Netanyahu’s motivations in waging the war.
This time, that unity has slipped, and some are questioning whether the timing of the escalations has to do with coalition politics: returning Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit Party to the coalition before critical budget votes in the Knesset in the coming days.
An agreement to bring Otzma Yehudit back into the government was brokered soon after the surprise bombing in Gaza began on Tuesday morning, fueling suspicion among those who attribute the worst motivations to Netanyahu that military decisions are being influenced not just by strategic needs but also by his political survival.
While war may change everything, in Israel it has not erased the deep political divisions.
Israel today is not the same country it was on October 6, 2023. The horrors of the Hamas attack shattered long-standing illusions about security, the reliability of intelligence, and the assumptions that governed Israeli military doctrine. The war has altered the country’s global standing and its military posture and even is forcing it to rethink fundamental questions such as haredi (ultra-Orthodox) conscription.
But it has not erased the deeper divides that existed before the war began. The judicial crisis, the protests, the distrust in leadership – all of it has returned, as if waiting just beneath the surface to erupt. Netanyahu’s intention of firing Bar this week sparked that eruption.
The country is at a crossroads. Militarily, it holds key advantages. But politically, it is once again getting entangled in its own dysfunction.
Whether the country emerges from this moment stronger or more fractured will not be decided in Gaza alone, but in the choices its leaders make, both in the coalition and opposition, and what its citizens choose to support or tolerate in the weeks and months ahead.
