Israelis awoke Tuesday morning to the dramatic news that the IAF launched an extensive surprise attack on Hamas in Gaza. Many likely wondered why a military offensive now would be any more effective in forcing Hamas to release the remaining hostages than it had been over the last 16 months.
In other words, what is different this time? What, if anything, has changed that could possibly lead to a more successful outcome this time around?
First of all, much has changed—with many, but not all, of the changes working in Israel’s favor.
The most significant and obvious change is that there is a new administration in the White House. If Tuesday morning’s air attacks signal a broader campaign, Israel will be able to wage it without fear of the US applying the brakes—thanks to President Donald Trump and his administration.
Under former president Joe Biden, Israel was operating under constraints: concerned that the US might hold up weapons deliveries (which it did), withhold diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council, or withdraw support if Israel cut off Gaza’s water or electricity.
Those concerns are no longer a factor. In fact, not only is the Trump administration not restraining Israel, but Trump’s rhetoric about “all hell breaking loose” if Hamas does not release the hostages seems even to be encouraging Israel to take stronger action.
Better position for IDF
This time, Israel is better positioned—because of American backing—to use humanitarian aid as leverage, a tactic that proved effective in the early days of the war and was credited as a key factor in Hamas agreeing to the first hostage deal in November 2023. Additionally, with US support, Israel will have more latitude to push back against international pressure to allow in aid that Hamas can hijack to maintain its grip on Gaza.
Another key shift is the broader regional context. Israel’s move against Hamas follows unprecedented American attacks on the Houthis and declarations that it will not tolerate continued assaults on one of the world’s most critical shipping lanes. This places Israel’s actions within a larger strategy to weaken Iran’s regional proxies and, potentially, to pressure Theran into negotiations on a new nuclear deal—something Trump has indicated he is interested in pursuing.
There has also been a shift within Israel’s military leadership. Not only is there a new US president, but also a new IDF chief of staff, Lt-Gen. Eyal Zamir, who has taken — at least outwardly — a more aggressive approach to the war in Gaza. Unlike his predecessor, Herzi Halevi, Zamir does not oppose the possibility of the IDF assuming control over aid distribution in Gaza—an approach that could significantly weaken Hamas’s hold over the territory.
Another factor working in Israel’s favor is that it can operate in Gaza without worrying that Hezbollah will enter the fray and unleash massive rocket barrages on Israeli cities.
Also, Hamas is not in the same position as it was at the outset of the war. While it began with a fully stocked rocket arsenal, its supply is now badly depleted and its capabilities significantly degraded. Notably, despite the IAF’s bombardment, Hamas on Tuesday, at least until nightfall,- did not fire a single rocket at Israel—not for lack of will, but apparently due to limited capacity.
It has reportedly recruited thousands of new terrroists over the two-month cease fire period, but they are obviously not as well trained as those Hamas fielded at the start of the war. By contrast, as this newwest round begins, Israel’s arms have been replenished, and its troops — both in the standing army and in the reserves — have had some time to rest.
Another distinguishing factor this time, at least in the initial hours, is Israel’s targeting strategy. The IAF is striking not only Hamas military leaders but also its civilian leadership, such as de facto Hamas prime minister Issam Da’alis. In addition, the two-month cease fire allowed it to gather valuable intelligence and to replenish its bank of Hamas targets. The surprise of Tuesday’s attack left some of Hamas’ terrorists exposed.
However, not all the changes favor Israel.
The first and most glaring difference is that while Israel went to war on October 7 with the full backing of the country, this time that is not the case. Many of the families of the remaining hostages, as well as former hostages such as Yarden Bibas, have come out loudly against the offensive, saying that it will endanger the hostages. The united front that existed when the war began does not exist this time.
Another complicating factor is the perception of political motivations. On October 7, there was no doubt that Israel went to war out of necessity, following Hamas’s brutal attack. This time, however, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s many critics believe political considerations—such as securing passage of the government’s budget—played a role in the timing of the operation.
Hours after the bombing began, Netanyahu signed an agreement bringing Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit back into the coalition, all but ensuring the passage of the budget. This has created a perception — absent in October 2023 — that, alongside military and strategic factors, political interests may have influenced the decision to launch the offensive now.
The bottom line: While Israel enters this new offensive with a more permissive US administration, a weakened Hamas, and greater operational flexibility, it does so without the same national unity, facing internal divisions and growing skepticism over political motivations. The military conditions may be more favorable, but the political landscape is much more fraught and volatile.
