The mobilization of reserve forces immediately after October 7 was as impressive as it was massive.
And it was massive — with government permission to mobilize some 360,000 reservists, the largest call-up since the 1973 Yom Kippur War. It was also impressive in terms of the rapidity with which the reservists answered the call and the numbers that showed up.
Though on October 6, thousands of reservists had said they would not show up for duty, on October 8, between 20% to 30% more reservists showed up at their bases than were summoned.
There were numerous stories of reservists turned away because there were simply not enough weapons to hand out.
That was then, some 19 months ago, after the country was invaded, its citizens murdered, raped, mutilated, and kidnapped, and its sovereignty and sense of security and self violated.
Motivation was at a fever pitch to destroy the enemy, retrieve the captives, and show the world that the days of getting away with killing Jews were over.
Nineteen months later, the intensity of those feelings has waned as the war drags on with conflicting aims, and the national debate rages on regarding what takes priority: roundly defeating Hamas or rescuing the remaining hostages.
IDF called up tens of thousands of reservists over weekend
The IDF said over the weekend that it was sending out tens of thousands of call-up orders to reservists for an expected offensive in Gaza, but this time, the IDF can only dream of a 120% show-up rate and will consider itself fortunate if 60%–70% of those who are called actually present themselves for duty.
Despite what some media outlets might suggest, this is not because a Vietnam-style anti-war sentiment has swept the country. By and large, the sizeable anti-government protests every Saturday night are not anti-war protests, though there are some elements of that on the fringes. Most demonstrators are not, however, questioning the morality of pounding Hamas.
Rather, these are “stop the war” protests — and there is a difference. These demonstrators are not saying war is wrong because Israel lacks the legitimacy to go after Hamas following its pogrom and because of the level of death and destruction in Gaza. Rather, they are saying stop the war to free the hostages and retrieve the bodies — and then feel free to resume the fight against Hamas at a later date.
Moreover, the sharp drop in reservist turnout is not, as some might portray it, due to a 1960s-style “give peace a chance” ethos. It’s the result of a range of other, more immediate and practical factors.
Battle fatigue
The first is sheer exhaustion — not just physical exhaustion for reservists who have been called up three, four, five, and even six times since October 7, but also emotional fatigue as well.
The strain of having to leave spouses and children … again. The strain of having to leave businesses and places of work … again. The strain of having to miss university classes and then struggle to catch up afterward … again.
With many reservists having already served upwards of 275 days since October 7, the disruption to their family lives, livelihoods, and careers is becoming unsustainable.
One of the key motivators for reservists has always been the deep camaraderie they share with their fellow soldiers — a sense of responsibility to people they’ve trained with, served with, and risked their lives for. But this is increasingly offset by home tension, forcing them to choose to whom they owe their primary allegiance: their wives and children or their units.
It is a cruel dilemma.
Loss of faith in the government
Another reason for the decline in motivation is the government and a sense many have that its decisions are motivated more by political calculations than strategic ones.
It may be completely off-base to say that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is prolonging the war for political reasons and not out of a desire to defeat Hamas or return the kidnapped hostages. Nevertheless, that perception has taken hold among a significant segment of the population — and with it, the question: why should we sacrifice so much for a war whose goals may be politically motivated?
Others are frustrated by how the war has been managed. They say they already went into Gaza, already risked their lives to take control of certain areas — only to see those areas vacated, and now they’re being asked to go back in and do it all again.
“Why didn’t they just finish the job the first time,” goes this common refrain. “Why are they calling us back in now to do the same thing all over again? It’s pointless.”
There is also frustration over the lack of clear objectives and an end game.
Reservists are being asked to risk their lives — and sacrifice their families and economic stability — for an operation whose goals are murky. When the prime minister and the chief of staff aren’t aligned on whether the primary goal of the war is to destroy Hamas or retrieve the hostages, that confusion trickles down. It does not inspire confidence. It breeds doubt and a sense of futility: Why are we doing this if they don’t know what they want?
The haredi factor
The ongoing saga regarding exemptions for ultra-Orthodox (haredim) cannot be overstated in analyzing the drop in reservist motivation. That the government is considering a law by Shavuot at the end of the month that would enshrine wholesale exemptions for Haredim even as reservists are being called in once again only adds insult to injury. One reservist put it bluntly: “I have to leave my wife and newborn for the fifth time because the haredim refuse to serve — this is simply not right.”
Had the army conscripted thousands of haredim last summer, they would now be trained and ready — like any other recruits, and their presence would have reduced the need to call up so many reservists now.
There is also a growing sense among many reservists that they are being exploited as a convenient, low-cost labor force that can be mobilized at a moment’s notice — with little regard for the personal and professional toll. If overused, the Tzav 8 emergency call-up orders will lose their urgency and credibility.
In the future, a major challenge for the IDF — beyond the enemy in Gaza — will be the erosion of public trust and stamina. To be won, wars require cohesion, clarity, and a sense among those asked to fight that the sacrifice is both necessary and shared. When reservists feel they are carrying the burden alone, without clear objectives or a united nation behind them, their willingness to keep showing up will begin to fray.
With new call-up orders going out, the early signs of that fraying are beginning to emerge — and if the country’s leaders, both political and military, want the public to keep showing up, they’ll need to show that the goals are clear, the burden is shared, and the sacrifice still makes sense.
